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1 Introduction
The order of entry of firms into a new industry will determine the dynamics of the industry. When a
more competitive firm enters a market first, it may easily be able to maintain its monopoly position
by preventing the entry of less competitive firms. However, when a less competitive firm enters the
market first, it may be difficult for it to prevent the entry of more competitive firms, which makes
the market more competitive. Thus, the order of firm entry is important not only for firms but
also for competition authorities.
In this paper, we examine the welfare effects of sequential market entry in a simple entry-
deterrence model with heterogeneous firms. In particular, we consider the question of whether a
less or more technologically efficient firm should be the first entrant to increase total surplus. If the
monopoly position is exogenously given, then a monopoly by a more efficient firm will naturally
yield greater total surplus than a monopoly by a less efficient firm. However, as shown in this paper,
this logic does not hold if the monopoly status is maintained endogenously by the incumbent’s (first
entrant’s) strategic measures to prevent the entry of potential competitors. This is because if a
less efficient firm enters first, it will have to adopt more aggressive strategies of producing more (or
charging a lower price) to deter the entry of a more efficient firm, which can be desirable for total
surplus.
We confirm the logic that empowering a less efficient firm to enter a market first could lead to
higher social surplus by considering two types of cost heterogeneities between firms: heterogeneities
in fixed and variable production costs. We first show that if the firms differ only in their fixed
production costs (we call this the case of fixed cost heterogeneity), total surplus can be decreasing
in the first entrant’s (incumbent’s) advantages in its fixed costs against a potential entrant. This
implies that providing a right of first entry into a market to a less efficient firm (rather than to a
more efficient firm) may yield greater total surplus. Second, if the two firms differ only in their
variable production costs (we call this the case of variable cost heterogeneity), the social surplus
is increasing or decreasing in the first entrant’s advantages in its variable costs, depending on the
first entrant’s strategies against the entrant (i.e., accommodating, deterring, and blocked entries).
The resulting social surplus is strictly greater in the case in which the more efficient firm is the first
entrant than in the case in which the less efficient firm is the first entrant. Finally, we consider the
mixed case in which two firms differ in both fixed and variable production costs and one firm has
overall advantages vis-a`-vis another (we call this the case of overall cost advantage). We show that
even in the case in which one firm is absolutely inferior to the other, this inferior firm should be
the first entrant to achieve higher total surplus in industries with large fixed costs.
Our findings have some important policy implications with regard to the welfare consequences of
free entry markets and the privatization of state-owned (public) monopolies. First, as Tirole (1988)
states, “some firms will enter the market early, possibly because of a technological lead”; a more
technologically advanced firm is likely to be the first to enter a new market with free entry. Our
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results suggest that such a plausible order of entry may create social losses due to the inefficient
strategy of deterring entry pursued by the first efficient entrant. Second, when a government
sells a public monopoly to a private firm in a privatization auction, firms with better technology
are expected to secure the right of the first entry (the incumbent position) because they can bid
higher than other firms with less technology. However, our results suggest that such auction-based
privatization approaches may undermine social surplus.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the theory of entry
deterrence and sequential entry. Section 3 sets up the model and characterizes the equilibria under
different strategies of the incumbent against the potential entrant. Section 4 investigates the effects
of entry order on total surplus. Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing the policy implications
of our findings, the relationship of our results to the existing literature, and the possible extensions
of the model.
2 Related Literature
Economists have long studied the possibility of entry deterrence by an incumbent firm. The classical
literature, such as Bain (1956) and Sylos-Labini (1962), shows that an incumbent firm can exercise
first-mover advantages in choosing greater output (or lower prices) to deter entry (a.k.a. the
Bain-Sylos postulate). Early theoretical studies such as Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) focus on
a commitment problem on the incumbent’s entry-deterrence strategy and show that building an
irreversible capacity prior to the entrants’ decision can make the incumbent’s strategy credible.1
Our simple model also employs a Dixit-type framework in which an incumbent firm (as a Stackelberg
leader) can hold excess capacity to deter entry.2
There are several empirical studies on whether and how firms invest in excess capacity to deter
entry. Lieberman (1987) examines excess capacity investment to deter entry in a sample of thirty-
eight chemical product industries and shows that incumbents rarely build excess capacity to deter
entry. However, using hospital data from electrophysiological studies, Dafny (2005) finds evidence
of entry-deterring investment, suggesting that hospitals could use experience to deter entry. Several
empirical studies also find evidence of strategic actions by incumbent firms to deter entry: investing
in hub-and-spoke networks in the airline industry (Aguirregabiria and Ho, 2010), expanding floor
space in the American casino industry (Cookson, 2018), expanding capacities beyond demand
growth in the global semiconductor manufacturing industry (Uzunca and Cassiman, 2020), and
extending product lines in the UK pharmaceutical market (Bokhari and Yan, 2020).
1For other important theoretical studies on entry deterrence, see Spulber (1981), Bernheim (1984), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1984), and Vives (1988). Additionally, for surveys of the theoretical literature, see Neven (1989), Wilson
(1992), and Belleflamme and Peitz (2015).
2Anderson and Engers (1994) endogenize the entry time in a (symmetric) Stackelberg-type model of entry de-
terrence and show that the welfare effect of fixed and marginal costs crucially depends on the market regime, i.e.,
accommodating, deterring, and blockaded entry.
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Our paper is closely related to the literature on sequential entry. Several theoretical studies
investigate the plausible entry order of heterogeneous firms. As Tirole (1988) states, “some firms
will enter the market early, possibly because of a technological lead,” and many theoretical studies
show that the order of entry into a market reflects relative efficiency. Quint and Einav (2005)
show that more efficient firms enter a market early in a war-of-attrition model with gradually sunk
entry costs. Pawlina and Kort (2006) investigate the consequences of exogenous asymmetry in the
(fixed) entry cost and show that the firm with the lowest cost always invests weakly earlier than the
opponent.3 Following Berry (1992), some empirical studies also assume this natural entry order.
For example, Scott Morton (1999) assumes that firms with the lowest entry costs enter a market
first. Our study contributes to the literature by suggesting that such natural entry sequences may
be undesirable from a welfare perspective due to the high competitiveness of the incumbent firm.
Our study also relates to the literature that investigates the welfare effects of firm heterogeneity
in oligopoly models. Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that the elimination of minor (less efficient) firms
improves average production efficiencies and may thereby enhance welfare. Additionally, Mukherjee
and Ray (2014) show that the entry of a less efficient firm with lower R&D (not production)
technology can reduce welfare. Whereas these two studies, which do not consider entry deterrence,
suggest that keeping less efficient firms out of the market may enhance welfare through production
and investment efficiency effects, our study suggests that keeping more efficient firms out of the
market may enhance welfare through aggressive entry deterrence of a less efficient incumbent.4
3 The model
Consider two firms intending to enter a certain new market. Entry is assumed to be sequential,
meaning that only a single firm can enter first and can act as an incumbent (we call it Firm I).
The incumbent can deter or accommodate the entry of another firm (a potential entrant, Firm E)
by credibly committing to its output level (e.g., by building capacity or using long-term contracts
as in Spence (1977), Dixit (1980), and Aghion and Bolton (1987)).5
Firm i’s (i ∈ {I, E}) profits are given by pii = P (Q)qi − Ci(qi), where P (Q) is the price (or
inverse demand), Q ≡ qI + qE is the total output, qi is Firm i’s output, and Ci(qi) is Firm i’s cost.
We assume that the inverse demand function is P (Q) = a−Q (Q ≡ qI+qE) to obtain clear results.
3Riordan (1992) shows that in a two-firm asymmetric game, entry in a market occurs in the order of firm efficiency.
However, Argenziano and Schmidt-Dengler (2012) offer a counterexample in a model with more than two firms where
the order of entry may not reflect the efficiency ranking.
4Furthermore, there are two studies showing that an incumbent can use weak firms as an instrument to prevent
the entry of much stronger firms. Ashiya (2000) shows that an incumbent firm may intentionally allow the entry of
a weak (less efficient) firm to stop the entry of a strong (more efficient) firm. Makadok and Ross (2018) show that
an incumbent may not drive a weak (less efficient) rival from the market to prevent a much stronger (more efficient)
rival from entering the market instead.
5The basic framework of our model is similar to that used in Cabral and Ross (2008) in that an incumbent and
entrant play a Stackelberg capacity-setting game.
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The cost function is given by
Ci(qi) =
{
fi + viqi if qi > 0,
0 if qi = 0,
where fi is the fixed setup (or entry) cost and vi is the variable (or marginal) cost. The two firms
must incur fixed setup costs when they enter the new market. As detailed in Section 4.1, we allow
for cost heterogeneity between firms in terms of fixed and variable costs.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage of the game, one of the two firms enters
a market, which we call Firm I, and chooses its capacity (or, equivalently, output) level. In the
second stage, another firm (Firm E) decides whether to enter the market, and if it enters, it chooses
its capacity (or output) level. We assume that the firms choose capacities when they enter and
that their output always equals their capacity. We compare total surplus in different sequences of
firm entry to answer the question of whether a more or less efficient firm should be the first entrant
from a welfare perspective.
3.1 Equilibrium
The game is solved backwards. In the second stage, the potential entrant, Firm E, chooses its output
level when it enters the market. The profit maximization problem is maxqE piE ≡ P (Q)qE−CE(qE)
given the incumbent firm’s output, qI . The first-order condition is:
∂P (Q)
∂qE
qE + P (Q)− C
′
E(qE) = 0,
which yields Firm E’s best response qYE (qI).
6 The superscript Y denotes the variable in the case in
which Firm E enters into the market. Using a linear demand specification, it reduces to qYE (qI) =
(a − vE − qI)/2, and the associated profits are pi
Y
E (qI) = (a− vE − qI)
2 /4 − fE . When Firm E
does not enter the market, its output is qNE = 0 and its profit is pi
N
E = 0, where the superscript N
denotes the variable without entry. Naturally, Firm E enters the market as long as piYE (qI) ≥ pi
N
E .
In the first stage, Firm I chooses the output level depending on the profitability of entry de-
terrence. There are three cases for Firm I to consider: the cases of entry accommodation, entry
deterrence, and blockaded entry . When Firm I chooses entry accommodation, it simply chooses
the Stackelberg leader’s output level, and Firm E enters and chooses the Stackelberg follower’s
output level. When Firm I chooses entry deterrence, it chooses the output level such that Firm
E’s expected profits from entering the market are zero. In the case of blockaded entry, Firm I can
choose an unconstrained monopoly output level that is sufficient to deter entry by the potential
entrant.
6The second-order condition is satisfied when ∂2P (Q)/∂q2E + 2∂P (Q)/∂qE − C
′′
E < 0 because we assume interior
solutions.
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In the case of entry accommodation, the profit maximization problem for Firm I is given by
maxqI P (Q) qI − CI (qI), where Q = qI + q
Y
E (qI). The first-order condition is:
∂P (Q)
∂qI
qI +
∂P (Q)
∂qYE (qI)
dqYE (qI)
dqI
qI + P (Q)− C
′
I(qI) = 0,
which gives us the equilibrium output for Firm I as qAI (vE , vI) and the equilibrium profits as
piAI (vE , vI , fI).
7 The superscript A refers to the case of entry accommodation. Then we have the
equilibrium output and profits for Firm E as qAE(vE , vI) and pi
A
E(vE , vI , fE), respectively, and the
equilibrium price as PA(vE , vI).
In the case of entry deterrence, Firm I chooses the output such that Firm E’s expected profits
from entering the market are zero. Therefore, the entry-deterrence output, qDI , is given such that
piYE (q
D
I ) = pi
N
E , where the superscript D refers to the case of entry deterrence. The equality yields
the equilibrium output qDI (vE , fE) and profits pi
D
I (vI , vE , fI , fE).
In the case of blockaded entry, Firm E would find it is unprofitable to enter even if Firm I chose
the unconstrained monopoly output level. Thus, we have the usual monopoly output, qBI (vI), that
satisfies
dP (qBI )
dqI
qBI + P (q
B
I )− C
′
I(q
B
I ) = 0 and qE = 0,
where the superscript B refers to the case of blockaded entry. The associated equilibrium profit
and price are given by piBI (vI , fI) and P
B(vI), respectively.
For a linear demand specification (P = a − Q), the equilibrium outputs, profits, and prices in
each case are shown in Table 1. Note that the entry-deterrence output and price, qDI and P
D,
depend only on the potential entrant’s cost, that is vE and fE , and not on the incumbent’ cost.
Additionally, qDI is decreasing in vE and fE , implying that the incumbent can easily prevent entry
by producing less output if the potential entrant has higher fixed and variable costs.
3.2 Endogenous Market Structure and the Total Surplus
Here, we derive the conditions under which the incumbent accommodates, deters, or blockades the
entry of the potential entrant and investigate what market structure is endogenously determined.
Entry accommodation occurs iff φD,A ≡ pi
D
I − pi
A
I < 0, and blockaded entry occurs iff φB,D ≡
qBI −q
D
I ≥ 0. Then, entry deterrence occurs iff φB,D < 0 ≤ φD,A. For a linear demand specification,
these critical values are obtained as follows:
φD,A =
(
a− vE − 2
√
fE
)(
vE − vI + 2
√
fE
)
−
(a+ vE − 2vI)
2
8
,
φB,D = 2
√
fE + vE −
a+ vI
2
.
7We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied.
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Table 1: Equilibrium outputs, profits, and prices for linear demand
Entry Accommodation
(𝑘 = 𝐴)
Entry Deterrence
(𝑘 = 𝐷)
Blockaded Entry
(𝑘 = 𝐵)
Outputs
𝑞!
"
𝑎 + 𝑣# − 2𝑣!
2
𝑎 − 𝑣# − 2 𝑓#
𝑎 − 𝑣!
2
𝑞#
"
𝑎 − 3𝑣# + 2𝑣!
4
0 0
Profits
𝜋!
" 𝑎 + 𝑣# − 2𝑣!
$
8
− 𝑓! 𝑎 − 𝑣# − 2 𝑓# 𝑣# − 𝑣! + 2 𝑓# − 𝑓! 𝑎 − 𝑣!
$ − 𝑓!
𝜋#
" 𝑎 − 3𝑣# + 2𝑣!
$
16
− 𝑓# 0 0
Price 𝑃"
𝑎 + 𝑣# + 2𝑣!
4
𝑣# + 2 𝑓#
𝑎 + 𝑣!
2
Depending on the sign conditions of the two critical values φD,A and φB,D, the market structure
(monopoly or duopoly) and the equilibrium patterns are endogenously characterized.
The equilibrium total surplus (or “welfare”) for each case, defined by the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, is given by:
WA ≡
∫ QA
0
P (s)ds− CI(q
A
I )− CE(q
A
E) for φD,A < 0,
WD ≡
∫ qDI
0
P (s)ds− CI(q
D
I ) for φB,D < 0 ≤ φD,A,
WB ≡
∫ qBI
0
P (s)ds− CI(q
B
I ) for φB,D ≥ 0.
4 Welfare Effect of Cost Heterogeneities
This section introduces three types of cost heterogeneity between firms. We define the two firms’
variable and fixed costs as follows:
vI ≡ (1− δv)v, vE ≡ δvv,
fI ≡ (1− δf )f, fE ≡ δff,
where v > 0 and f > 0 are variable and fixed cost parameters, respectively, that are common to
both firms. The degree of cost heterogeneity is expressed by δv ∈ (0, 1) and δf ∈ (0, 1). When
δv = δf = 1/2, the incumbent (Firm I) and the potential entrant (Firm E) are symmetric. The
closer δv and δf are to 1, the lower the variable and fixed costs that the incumbent has than the
potential entrant.
We consider the following three cases of cost heterogeneity between firms: fixed cost hetero-
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geneity, variable cost heterogeneity, and an overall cost advantage. In the fixed cost heterogeneity
case, we investigate the effect of changes in δf on the equilibrium variables, given that both firms
have the same variable cost parameter (i.e., δv = 1/2). In the variable cost heterogeneity case,
we investigate the effect of changes in δv, given that both firms have the same fixed cost (i.e.,
δf = 1/2). In the final case of overall cost advantages, we want to investigate the effect of overall
changes in both cost parameters, so we assume δv = δf = δ¯ and investigate the effect of changes in
δ¯. Such stark specifications make the analysis of the welfare effect of cost heterogeneities intuitive
and simple.
4.1 The Case of Fixed Cost Heterogeneity
First, we examine the welfare effect of the fixed cost heterogeneity between two firms. In the case of
entry accommodation, we easily find that ∂WA/∂δf = 0 always holds because both firms operate
in the market and the sum of the fixed costs of both firms is always constant.
In the case of entry deterrence, the effect of changes in fixed cost heterogeneity (δf ) on the
equilibrium output (qDI ) is given by total differentiation of the condition pi
Y
E = 0 in q
D
I and δf :
P ′(Q)qYE (qDI ) + (P ′(Q)qYE (qDI ) + P (Q)− δvv︸ ︷︷ ︸)
dpiE/dqE=0
∂qYE (q
D
I )
∂qDI

 dqDI − [f]dδf = 0.
Then, we have
dqDI
dδf
=
f
P ′(Q)qYE (q
D
I )
< 0, (1)
which implies that the greater the fixed costs of the potential entrant are, the smaller the equilibrium
(entry deterrence) output the first entrant offers.
The welfare effect of a change in the fixed cost advantage is given by
∂WD
∂δf
∣∣∣∣
δv=1/2
=
[
P
(
qDI
)
−
1
2
v
]
dqDI
dδf
+ f
= f
[
1−
P
(
qDI
)
− (1/2)v
P
(
qDI + q
Y
E (q
D
I )
)
− (1/2)v
]
< 0. (2)
Because
P(qDI )−(1/2)v
P(qDI +q
Y
E
(qD
I
))−(1/2)v
> 1, the welfare effect of an increase in the first entrant’s relative fixed
cost advantage is always negative. For a linear demand specification, it reduces to
∂WD
∂δf
= −
f [
√
δff + (2δv − 1)v]√
δff
,
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W
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The first entrant’s fixed-cost advantage over another (    )δf
Figure 1: Welfare under fixed cost advantage (a = 50, v = 2, δv = 1/2, f = 200)
and substituting δv = 1/2 into the above yields ∂W
D/∂δf = −f < 0, indicating that an increase in
the first entrant’s relative fixed cost advantage harms welfare. The intuition behind the result is as
follows. An increase in δf has two opposite effects on total surplus: the first is the positive direct
effect from the smaller fixed cost of the incumbent, which is expressed by the first term in blankets
in Eq. (2); the second is the negative effect from the smaller entry-deterrence output chosen by the
incumbent, as shown in Eq. (1). Because the latter dominates the former, the improved relative
efficiency on the fixed cost of the incumbent against the potential entrant reduces total surplus in
the case of entry deterrence.
On the other hand, in the case of blockaded entry, we easily find that ∂WB/∂δf = f > 0 holds,
implying that the improved efficiency on the fixed cost of the incumbent is always beneficial to
total surplus. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the case of fixed cost heterogeneity, equilibrium welfare is independent, decreas-
ing, and increasing in the first entrant’s fixed cost advantage if the subsequent entry is accommo-
dated, deterred, and blockaded, respectively.
Figure 1 illustrates the welfare effect of fixed cost heterogeneity for a linear demand specification.
The horizontal axis represents the value of δf (the relative efficiency of the first entrant’s fixed
costs). The dotted vertical line of δf = 1/2 corresponds to the case of symmetric firms. The
shaded area around δf = 0 represents the region of entry accommodation (φD,A < 0), in which
the potential entrant’s fixed costs are so small that the incumbent cannot deter entry. The other
shaded area around δf = 1 corresponds to the region of blockaded entry (φB,D ≥ 0), in which the
potential entrant’s fixed costs are so large relative to the first entrant’s that there is no need for the
incumbent to undertake any entry-deterrence strategies. The interim, non-shaded area corresponds
to the case of entry deterrence. As shown in Proposition 1, the welfare is decreasing and increasing
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in δf in the entry deterrence and blockaded entry areas, respectively.
Now, we have the following corollary that answers the question of which firm, the more efficient
or less efficient firm, should be the first entrant.
Corollary 1 In the case of fixed cost heterogeneity with a linear demand specification, a less effi-
cient firm entering the market first leads to a higher total surplus for f < 3128(2a− v)
2.
As shown in Figure 1, in the entry-deterrence area, welfare is always greater if the incumbent has a
higher fixed cost than the entrant. Therefore, providing the right of first entry to a less efficient firm
is socially beneficial because the less efficient incumbent chooses greater output to deter the more
efficient potential entrant, as shown in Eq. (1). The comparison of welfare in the other two areas,
entry accommodation and blockaded entry, is somewhat difficult, but we easily find the sufficient
condition in which providing the right of first entry to a less efficient firm is socially beneficial.
The sufficient condition is WA|δf=0 −W
B|δf=1 =
3
128(2a − v)
2 − f > 0, which corresponds to the
condition that the welfare on the left side region of δf = 1/2 in Figure 1 is always higher than that
on the right side of it.
4.2 The Case of Variable Cost Heterogeneity
Here, we examine the welfare effect of the variable cost heterogeneity between two firms. First, in
the case of entry accommodation, we have
dWA
dδv
= P (QA)
dQA
dδv
− v
[
(1− δv)
dqAI
dδv
+ δv
dqAE
dδv
]
+ v
(
qAI − q
A
E
)
=
[
P ′(QA)qAI
] dqAI
dδv
+
[
P ′(QA)qAE
] dqAE
dδv
+ v
(
qAI − q
A
E
)
= qAI
[
P ′(QA)
dqAI
dδv
+ v
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ or −
+qAE
[
P ′(QA)
dqAE
dδv
− v
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ or −
.
The sign of the above derivative is ambiguous and depends on both the absolute value of the
variable cost v, the heterogeneity parameter δv, and the relative magnitude of q
A
I and q
A
E . If δv
is sufficiently small (i.e., the first entrant is much less efficient), it may hold that qAI < q
A
E . In
that case, an increase in δv (an improvement in the relative efficiency in the variable costs of the
first entrant) reduces the total surplus by causing production substitution from a more efficient
Stackelberg follower to a less efficient Stackelberg leader. On the other hand, if δv is large enough
(i.e., the first entrant is much more efficient), an increase in δv causes production substitution
from a less efficient Stackelberg follower to a more efficient leader, which improves total surplus.
The result is a Stackelberg version of Salant and Shaffer’s (1999) finding that the total surplus is
increasing in the dispersion of marginal costs among Cournot-competing firms.
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Second, in the case of entry deterrence, the total differentiation of piYE = 0 in q
D
I and δv yields
the following:
P ′(Q)qYE (qDI ) + (P ′(Q)qYE (qDI ) + P (Q)− δvv︸ ︷︷ ︸)
∂piE/∂qE = 0
∂qYE (q
D
I )
∂qDI

 dqDI − [vqYE (qDI )] dδv = 0.
Then we have
dqDI
dδv
=
v
P ′(Q)
< 0, (3)
implying that the greater the variable costs of the potential entrant are, the smaller the entry-
deterrence output the first entrant offers.
Now, we have the welfare effect of a change in variable cost heterogeneity as
∂WD
∂δv
=
[
P
(
qDI
)
− (1− δv)v
] dqDI
dδv
+ vqDI
= (P
(
qDI
)
− (1− δv)v)
v
P ′(Q)
+ vqDI
= v
[
P
(
qDI
)
+ P ′(Q)qDI − (1− δv)v
P ′(Q)
]
> 0.
The sign condition of the above comes from qDI > q
A
I and
P (qDI ) + P
′(Q)qDI − (1− δv)v < P (Q) + P
′(Q)qAI − (1− δv)v = 0.
For a linear demand specification, we have dWD/dδv = v
[
a+ v −
(
4
√
δff + 3δv
)]
> 0. From
φB,D < 0, in the linear demand function case, the sign of the welfare effect of a change in the
variable cost advantage is positive. Although the improved relative efficiency of the variable cost
of the incumbent reduces the entry-deterrence output, as shown in Eq. (3), it directly improves
the incumbent’s production efficiency. Therefore, an increase in δv in the entry-deterrence region
necessarily enhances welfare.
Third, in the case of blockaded entry, the welfare effect of changes in δv is obviously positive:
dWB
dδv
=
[
P (qBI )− (1− δv)v
] dqBI
dδv
+ vqBI > 0,
and dWB/dδv = 3v[a− v(1− δv)]/4 > 0 for a linear specification. Therefore, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 In the case of variable cost heterogeneity, equilibrium welfare is strictly increasing
in the first entrant’s variable cost advantages if the subsequent entry is deterred and blockaded. It
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Figure 2: Welfare under variable cost advantage (a = 30, v = 8, δf = 1/2, f = 33)
may be decreasing in the case of entry accommodation for small δv.
Figure 2 depicts the welfare effect of variable cost heterogeneity. In the figure, the horizontal
axis represents the incumbent’s variable cost advantage over the potential entrant, δv. The dotted
vertical line δv = 1/2 represents the symmetric case. We can see from the figure that total surplus is
decreasing in δv only in the region of entry accommodation. This is due to the inefficient production
substitution effect mentioned above. Therefore, an improvement in the relative efficiency of the
variable costs of the first entrant is beneficial to welfare except for the entry accommodation case.
Now, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 In the case of variable cost heterogeneity with a linear demand specification, a more
efficient firm entering the market first leads to a higher total surplus.
The result is quite intuitive: the lower the variable cost the incumbent (or the first entrant) has,
the higher the total surplus. This can be confirmed by comparing the welfare level on the left side
of δv = 1/2 with that on the right side of it (or by folding the figure along the dotted line in the
middle). Therefore, providing a right of first entry into a market to a more efficient firm is socially
beneficial, which is in contrast to the case of fixed cost heterogeneity.
4.3 The Case of Overall Cost Advantage
Thus far, we have separately investigated the welfare effects of fixed and variable cost heterogeneity.
Here, we consider the case in which one firm has advantages over the other in terms of both fixed
and variable costs, which we call the case of overall cost advantage. In what follows, we assume
that δf = δv = δ¯ and investigate the effect of changes in δ¯. Of course, it seems to be somewhat
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Figure 3: Welfare under overall-cost advantage
(left) a = 50, v = 2, f = 200 ; (right) a = 30, v = 5, f = 50.
impractical to express the cost disparities between firms as a constant rate, but it is a reasonable
simplification to consider the effect of the overall technology gap between firms.
Now, combining the results obtained in the last two subsections, we have the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 In the case of overall cost advantage, depending on the relative magnitude of vari-
able and fixed costs, equilibrium welfare is increasing or decreasing in the relative efficiency of the
first entrant in both variable and fixed costs if subsequent entry is accommodated or deterred and is
strictly increasing if subsequent entry is blockaded.
When the fixed costs account for a larger proportion of the total production costs, then the welfare
under entry deterrence is more likely to decrease in the first entrant’s relative efficiency δ¯. On
the other hand, when the variable costs account for a large proportion, the welfare under entry
deterrence may be increasing or inverse-U shaped (have a maximum value for a certain value of δ¯).
Figure 3 depicts the equilibrium welfare in the case of overall cost advantage for a larger value of
f (f/v = 100) in the left panel and for a smaller value of f (f/v = 10) in the right panel.
Now, the final corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3 In the case of an overall cost advantage with a linear demand specification, when fixed
costs account for a larger share in production, a less efficient firm entering the market first leads
to higher total surplus.
Corollary 3 indicates that which firm, the more or less efficient firm, should be the first entrant
depends on the relative magnitude of variable and fixed costs in production processes. As shown
in the left panel of Figure 3, when the fixed costs are significant in production, the welfare on the
13
left side of δ¯ = 0.5 is generally higher than that on the right side of it, which implies that a less
efficient firm should be the first entrant. On the other hand, as shown in the right panel of Figure
3, when the fixed costs are not significant in production, the welfare on the left side of δ¯ = 0.5 is
generally lower than that on the right side of it, which implies that a more efficient firm should be
the first entrant. Therefore, we can conclude that the proportion of fixed to variable costs is crucial
for determining the welfare effects of entry order.
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
In this section, we conclude the paper by briefly discussing some extensions of the basic setup and
some policy implications of our analysis.
This paper has investigated the socially beneficial order of entry into a new market for hetero-
geneous firms. We have shown that the plausible order of entry, where a more efficient firm enters
into a market first, may lead to social inefficiency because of the less aggressive entry deterrence of
the first entrant. Even if one firm is absolutely inferior in both variable and fixed production costs
over another, it may be preferable in terms of welfare to let the inefficient firm enter the market
first.
Two possible extensions of our basic model can be noted. The first extension is to consider
cost heterogeneity such that one firm has lower fixed costs and higher variable costs than another.
Suppose the case of vI < vE and fI > fE . Then, it can be seen immediately from Corollaries
1 and 2 that the incumbent firm will produce greater Stackelberg, entry-deterrence, or monopoly
outputs at lower variable costs, which is necessarily desirable for total surplus. Suppose now the
opposite case of vI > vE and fI < fE . Then, the incumbent firm will produce smaller Stackelberg,
entry-deterrence, or monopoly outputs at higher variable costs, which is necessarily undesirable for
total surplus. Therefore, we can state that if the government can grant a firm the right to be the
first to enter a market, it is desirable to grant it to a firm with relatively lower variable and higher
fixed costs.
The second extension is to consider what would happen if the firms were to engage in price
(Bertrand) competition with entry deterrence instead of Stackelberg output competition. Consider
the sequential price competition between Firms I and E producing homogeneous products. In the
case of fixed cost heterogeneity (with equal variable costs vI = vE), then only a firm with lower fixed
costs can exist, irrespective of the order of entry. This is because there are second-mover advantages
in this class of price competition, so it is impossible for a firm with higher fixed costs to deter the
entry of a firm with lower fixed costs. Additionally, in the case of variable cost heterogeneity (with
equal fixed costs fI = fE), only a firm with lower variable costs can exist, irrespective of the order
of entry. These results indicate that even if a less efficient firm enters the market first, only a more
efficient firm would survive in the market by setting a monopoly price or a price that prevents the
less efficient firm from (re-)entering the market. Therefore, the order of entry does not matter for
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welfare in the case of price competition.
Our results have important policy implications for the means of privatizing public monopolies.
Since the 1980s, the world has experienced a massive liberalization and privatization of public-sector
companies that provide, for example, water and sanitation, urban and local transportation, garbage
disposal, postal services, electricity, and gas. Generally, these public services incur large fixed costs
to operate. Public auction (competitive bidding) is one of the popular privatization methods to
allocate the ownership rights of such public companies.8 If a government sells a monopoly public
firm in privatization auctions, the winner will be the firm with the most efficient management and
operation technologies. However, as shown in this paper, granting a firm with efficient technologies
the right to enter the market first may not be desirable from a social welfare point of view because
the winning firm can easily prevent others from entering the market.9
Finally, our results have two important implications for competition policy, particularly with
respect to entry regulation. First, our result suggests that free entry can lead to social inefficiency
for a different reason than in the “excess entry” result of Mankiw and Whinston (1986). The
seminal work of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) shows that the free-entry number of firms is socially
excessive in oligopolistic industries in the presence of scale economies because new market entrants
essentially steal business from incumbents, which leads to a wasteful use of resources of entrants’
fixed costs.10 In contrast, our inefficiency result comes from the less aggressive entry-deterrence
efforts by a more efficient first entrant (incumbent). Given that it is plausible that more efficient
firms would enter a new market first,11 our conclusion highlights a new inefficiency in free entry
markets: a plausible entry order under free entry can lead to social inefficiency in the presence of
scale economies and heterogeneous production costs among firms.
Second, our result suggests that if the monopoly position is secured through successful entry
deterrence, then a more efficient firm, rather than a less efficient firm, should be eliminated from
(or should be placed outside) the market, which is in stark contrast to a series of studies beginning
with Lahiri and Ono (1988). Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that eliminating firms with less efficient
variable costs from a market improves average production efficiency and may improve welfare. The
similar efficient effect works in the result of Salant and Shaffer (1999) where an increased variance
in firms’ variable costs lowers average variable costs per unit of output sold, which improves welfare.
8For more information on the example, method, and the integrated review of privatization, see Vickers and Yarrow
(1991), Berg and Berg (1997), and Bognetti and Obermann (2008).
9Our results suggest that it may be better for social welfare to give the right to enter the market first to a less
efficient firm rather than to a more efficient firm. However, while the government can select the most efficient firm
through auctions, information problems make it difficult for the government to select an inefficient firm. In this case,
it may still be better to allocate the ownership rights of public monopolies at random than to allocate them through
auctions.
10Mukherjee (2012) shows that the free-entry number of firms can be socially insufficient in an industry with a
quantity-setting leader and many followers when the variable production costs of the market leader are much lower
than those of followers.
11As mentioned in Section 2, many theoretical and empirical studies show and assume that it is plausible that more
efficient firms enter a market early (e.g., Tirole 1988; Berry 1992; Scott Morton 1999; Quint and Einav 2005; Pawlina
and Kort 2006).
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In contrast, our study suggests that the opposite conclusion can be drawn when we consider the
presence of fixed costs and the first entrant’s entry deterrence behavior.
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